


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# SPECIAL REPORT

FRANCE'S AFRICAN PROTEGES GROWING MORE RESTIVE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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12 June 1964

**FRANCE'S AFRICAN PROTEGES GROWING MORE RESTIVE**

The 13 former French territories in Black Africa which have maintained, since independence in 1960, close economic, political, and cultural ties to Paris, now seem more inclined to turn away from their former metropole. This desire is discernible not only in Congo (Brazzaville) and Dahomey, where revolutions last year brought more nationalistic-minded regimes to power, but also in countries, like Chad and Ivory Coast, which are still headed by pro-French "first generation" leaders. The moves to loosen ties with France appear to be both a response to pressure from younger elements, who regard dependence on France as neocolonialism, and a reaction to continuing French meddling.


Leaders of most of these countries remain basically pro-Western in orientation. They are turning first to the US and other Western sources for economic aid in order to reduce their dependence on France. There is increasing evidence, however, that they intend to seek aid from Communist countries as well, especially if their requests are not satisfied by the West.

Scope of the French Presence

France's presence and influence in its Black African protégé states have remained pervasive since De Gaulle sanctioned their accession to formal independence in 1960. Each of these states signed economic, cultural, and military agreements with France, for the most part either just before or shortly after independence. In effect, these accords preserved almost intact the comprehensive ties which France had developed with its African territories during the colonial period.

The continuity has been most striking in the economic area. As they did when they were colonies, all these countries have received large amounts of French public and private assistance. All of these former colonies benefit from association with EEC--achieved through Paris --and most are recipients of direct French budgetary subventions as well as of French price supports for their primary products. They also receive technical assistance through which thousands of French specialists and administrators are continuing to serve in Africa. All are full

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	POPULATION (est. in millions)	ANNUAL FRENCH AID (est. in millions of US dollars)		FRENCH TROOPS Now Present
		Military	Bilateral Nonmilitary*	
Cameroon	4.3	7	50.0	1,000
Central African Republic	1.3	5	11.0	1,300
Chad	3.0	11	20.0	3,000
Congo (Brazzaville)	.8	4	9.0	1,700
Dahomey	2.1	9	6.0	900
Gabon	.5	1	9.2	350
Ivory Coast	3.5	9	41.0	1,200
Malagasy Republic	5.9	38	55.5	7,400
Mauritania	.8	10	8.0	2,500
Niger	3.3	7	4.0	1,500
Senegal	3.2	20	35.0	7,900
Togo	1.5	1	5.5	**
Upper Volta	4.5	2	18.8	**
Estimated cost of maintaining French Air Force Personnel in this area.		10		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>34.7</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>273.0</b>	<b>28,750</b>

\* These figures represent estimates of aid supplied through the official agency, Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération (FAC). They probably are appreciably lower than the value of the total public and private nonmilitary aid effort, however, because of the considerable amount of indirect assistance provided outside official channels.

\*\* Small administrative detachments for military aid.

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members of the French franc zone and are thus assured of access to otherwise unavailable foreign exchange reserves. As a result, none of these countries has experienced the acute economic difficulties encountered by the two ex-French colonies--Guinea and Mali--which refused to go along with the new French "system."

In the military sphere, all 13 countries have entrusted France with training--which in most cases means actually directing--their national armies and police. All but one--Upper Volta--have some type of agreement providing for close collaboration with France in defense matters. Under these arrangements, Paris maintains some 28,000 troops of the French Overseas Army distributed among 11 of the 13 states, and major land and air bases in Senegal, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), the Central African Republic, and the Malagasy Republic.

In addition, France has special secret agreements with six countries--Chad, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Niger, and the Malagasy Republic--under which those states can request French help in preserving internal order. Such an agreement provided the legal basis for the intervention of French troops in Gabon to restore President Leon Mba last February, after he had been overthrown by a coup d'etat.

On the cultural side, French is the official language

in all these countries. Frenchmen predominate as instructors in the schools, where the French system of education has continued. The African leaders of these countries have taken on French mores and become "Frenchified." Paris attaches great importance to perpetuating these cultural links and has generally resisted any foreign--especially "Anglo-Saxon"--inroads.

In addition to the official relationships, a relatively small community of private French businessmen generally controls the commercial life of each country. Some of these businessmen have resided in Africa for many years, acquiring extensive political influence over local African leaders and, in some cases, in Paris as well. The archetype of these "colons," whose unreconstructed attitudes and behavior are particularly offensive to African nationalists, is probably Roland Bru, long a power behind Mba in Gabon. Bru is reported to have played an important role in influencing the French decision to intervene there.

#### The Revolutionary Regimes

Under the prodding of its leftist labor and youth elements, the Massamba-Debat regime which took over in Congo (Brazzaville) after conservative President Youlou's ouster last August has taken a sharp turn to the left away from Paris.

The new government has been under rising pressure for many

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months to demand the withdrawal of the French troops based in the country. Last March, the leftist-dominated national assembly formally called for revision of the military accords with France, more rapid replacement of Frenchmen by Africans in government departments, and Congo's withdrawal from the African and Malagasy Union (UAM)--the Paris-backed grouping of French protégé states plus Rwanda.

Moderate President Massamba-Debat, mindful of the vital importance of continued French economic support and of the stabilizing effect of French troops, evidently intends to drag his feet on these recommendations. Even the more radical prime minister, Pascal Lissouba, has explained to the assembly that the government would not be able to act "at least until the end of the year."

Nevertheless, Massamba has implemented a vigorous and positive "nonalignment" policy to the point where his country's international posture now is more akin to that of the African radicals than to that of the moderates. Since February the regime has shifted diplomatic ties from Nationalist to Communist China and has established relations with the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Cuba. France and the US have been the targets of several sharp official attacks, although new economic aid commitments have been sought in Washington as well as in the

Communist world. Within recent weeks Massamba has even been actively promoting a special relationship, including military aid features, with the radical regime in Ghana. All this points to a further decline of French influence and slippage to the left in the Brazzaville regime.

The government which came to power by revolution in Dahomey last October is much more moderate than its Brazzaville counterpart, but is also appreciably less French oriented than its predecessor. As in Brazzaville, anti-French sentiment becomes particularly evident in Dahomey whenever the new regime considers itself in any way threatened. In March, a revolt by northern tribal partisans of ex-President Maga brought immediate charges by Premier Ahomadegbe that "foreign enemies"--unfriendly French elements were clearly in mind--were aiding the insurgents. There were reports then that the Dahomeans were considering asking Paris to remove its troops from the country, but no such demand materialized.

It appears that the leaders of the new Dahomey regime, notably President Apithy, who has long been partial to the continent's radical nationalists, rather desperately want to assert their independence from France. However, they also are aware of the close mesh of French influences, and hesitate to act rashly. Moreover, the regime is not, at this time, subject to the same degree of pressure

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from volatile leftist elements as are the Brazzaville moderates.

#### The Conservative Regimes

The most dramatic example of official restlessness among the conservative French African states is in Chad, where President Tombalbaye gave official sanction to a sharp anti-French campaign. In a speech on 7 April, Tombalbaye denounced "bad Frenchmen" and in particular a certain "impenitent colonialist" businessman who had been expelled three days before. Three weeks later, Tombalbaye returned to this theme in a second speech which he subsequently privately labeled Chad's "declaration of economic independence from France."

After these speeches a unanimously approved assembly resolution demanded the evacuation of all French military bases "as soon as possible" and the rapid Africanization of top positions in the Chadian Government. Tombalbaye has not acted yet. Since his first speech, the President has been careful to distinguish between "bad" and "good" Frenchmen. The former category includes neocolonialists and advocates of Cartierism--a doctrine which holds that French foreign aid money could be better used at home. "Good" Frenchmen are those who follow the liberal policies of General de Gaulle.

The anti-French noises subsided last month, while Chad was negotiating new aid and military

accords with Paris. Recently, however, the attack resumed--13 French nationals have been expelled from Chad and more will probably follow. Tombalbaye also dispatched an aid-seeking mission to Western Europe, the US, and Canada in an effort to reduce his dependence on France.

Upper Volta's President Maurice Yameogo has pursued much the same approach. Last April, he accused four French Army training officers of attempting to turn Upper Volta's army against the regime. At a party congress in early May, Yameogo reportedly denounced the activities of private French businessmen, the French Roman Catholic clergy in Upper Volta, and colonialism in general.

The Yameogo government also has announced a friendship mission to central and eastern Europe "in line with Upper Volta's policy of nonalignment." The country has no diplomatic or significant economic relations with any Communist countries--indeed, Yameogo has in the past insisted he would have no Communist representatives in his country--but this latest expression of independence could portend a policy shift. Undoubtedly Yameogo also would welcome opportunities to reduce Upper Volta's economic dependence on France.

In neighboring Ivory Coast, internal and external criticism of total French domination of the local industrial and commercial sectors has kept pressure on the

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government to Africanize. Since last August several unreconstructed Frenchmen were expelled from Abidjan. The French-dominated Ivory Coast Chamber of Commerce was revamped in May to allow for 50-percent African membership, and the government intervened to block the re-election of the previous president, an "ugly Frenchman" of colonialist mentality. The government also reportedly plans a comprehensive revision of its import policies, including commercial agreements with France, to permit greater freedom of imports from EEC countries and the US. It appears doubtful, however, that any really active campaign to break the French hold on the local economy is about to be undertaken.

In Mauritania, President Moktar Ould Daddah since 1960 has been seeking wider recognition of his country's independence--disputed by Morocco, which claims sovereignty over the area. Special efforts have been made, to the annoyance of Paris, to curry favor with the UAR and Algeria. Partly to enhance his regime's image in the eyes of such radical governments, Moktar recently renounced French budgetary support and launched an austerity program to compensate. Mauritania has also announced its intention to send a goodwill mission to Moscow, indicating at the same time a desire to "intensify" relations with the US.

Cameroon President Ahidjo, while not directly attacking

the French, has indicated a desire to broaden his base of economic support. A Soviet trade mission was recently established in Yaoundé, and shortly afterward an agreement to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR was announced. A Soviet embassy will probably be opened this month; and the opening may be marked by a token aid offer from the USSR. Cameroon repeatedly indicates that it wants greater US aid, presumably as a means of lessening dependence on France.

In Niger, a number of recent speeches attacked the role played by the French colonizers and ignored the substantial French contribution to the country. Niger recently signed a cultural agreement with North Korea and reportedly expressed its hope that economic and technical agreements will follow. Central African Republic President David Dacko also recently attacked "bad Frenchmen" at a National Assembly session.

Even Malagasy Republic President Tsiranana who is fervently pro - De Gaulle, has reportedly sent a mission to negotiate trade agreements with Poland and the USSR, and possibly with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria.

Only Senegal, Togo, and Gabon offer no recent evidence of official restiveness in the French embrace. In the first two of these states the absence of the syndrome arises from the fact that the elements most inclined to strain at the bonds were excluded from power or rendered ineffective some time ago.

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### Gabon a Special Case

As a result of France's military intervention in Gabon last February, the regime of President Mba now is totally dependent on French support and popular feeling is presently more inflamed against France than anywhere else in de Gaulle's African preserve. The French in their anxiety to check spreading instability in French Africa and to preserve access to Gabon's rich mineral deposits, seriously underestimated the amount of anti-Mba sentiment which had developed among the Gabonese, especially the young educated elements.

A temporary calm is being maintained by the conspicuous presence of French Army troops, while Mba tries to rehabilitate his regime. However, his political foes will almost certainly again attempt a new move to oust him, confronting the French with another intervention dilemma. It seems likely that any successor regime, and especially one including the political elements suppressed in February, would have a basically anti-French cast.

### Basic Causes of Unrest

Regardless of local variations, there appear to be some general, basic, sociopolitical conditions responsible for the over-all trend. The desire to move away from France is already strongest among the growing number of younger, more nationalist

elements, some of whom occupy high government positions. These "young Africans" are evidently convinced that national development demands a "nonaligned" or at least a less French-aligned policy.

France's intervention in Gabon has made the presence of French troops on African soil even more difficult to accept. However, the Gabon affair has made the young and ambitious elements aware that Paris, if it chose, might be able to maintain the existing conservative regimes in power almost indefinitely. While this may induce caution in some, it sharpens the frustration of others.

The present African leaders of these countries appear to be acceding to public pressure. The responses range from Brazzaville's real break with essential features of the relationship established in 1960, to Ivory Coast's symbolic gestures. The leaders are also well aware of the dangers inherent in being placed in Mba's present position--which appears to be secure only as long as French troops patrol Libreville. Chad's President Tombalbaye first blessed French intervention to restore Mba, but has now come to regard it as "unwise."

Discontent over poor economic conditions, which are endemic in this area, is another basis for anti-French sentiments. The overwhelming French presence in the economic sphere leads

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some elements, particularly those with a higher horizon of expectations, to regard this presence as the cause of economic failure.

Economic conditions also have contributed to domestic political unrest. In reacting to this, the African leaders have generally moved to consolidate their own positions by establishing one-party states and a single government-controlled trade union, and in general by suppressing opposition. Where this suppression utilizes direct French support, as in Gabon, it directly reinforces anti-French feeling. Aside from dramatic interventions, the very degree of French interest and presence continually exerts influence on a day-to-day level. The meddling, both by the French Government and particularly by private Frenchmen, is deeply resented by the young Africans, and increasingly also by the older pro-French leaders themselves.

External criticism of the conservative regimes for their French-oriented systems and policies has had its effect, too. The conservative leaders have been castigated by the more radical African governments, and at times by Communist countries, as French puppets and instruments of neocolonialism. The formation last year of the Organization of African Unity--the "universal" African political organization measurably increased pressure on these leaders to cast off their French

ties. The subsequent dissolution of the African radicals' "Casablanca" grouping and the rival "Monrovia" bloc of moderate states left the relatively close-knit Afro-Malagasy Union exposed to charges of "sabotaging" African unity. Now, in the face of such pressures and internal rivalries, the UAM, too, is in the process of dissolution.

### French Reaction

France's public reaction to these rumblings in the protégé states has been generally relaxed. For the most part, French spokesmen have either ignored anti-French moves entirely or else minimized them as harmless gestures to be expected of new countries anxious to emphasize their independence. Except for a long-planned reduction of French military forces in Africa, now under way, no major policy shift by Paris appears to be in the offing. Reaction to specific situations will apparently continue on an ad hoc basis.

Privately, however, officials in Paris have exhibited considerable concern over the growing threat to the French position and have taken some steps to halt it. Although Paris maintained that it was "officially uninformed" about the Chad assembly's resolve to remove French troops, there is good evidence to suggest that in early May Paris advised Tombalbaye that an "official

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communication" of the assembly action would be "incompatible" with the imminent commencement of aid talks. Yameogo's castigation of the four French training officers also provoked sharp expressions of French displeasure.

On the other hand, Paris now seems genuinely resigned to a drastically reduced role in Brazzaville. It reportedly has decided to remove all its troops from Congo by the end of 1965. France has, however, given no indication that it plans to change its economic aid policy toward Brazzaville.

A more general French appraisal of the situation was voiced recently by the director of African Affairs at the French Foreign Ministry, who told a US official that the policy of "nonalignment" which is spreading throughout former French Africa is not necessarily disadvantageous. It was this official's view that if the present African governments do not contact the East, their domestic opponents will.

At least some elements of the French Government have charged that the US is behind France's problems in Africa. In Gabon, local French elements have been involved in anti-US

activities, and there are indications that an effort may be made to link US Embassy personnel to the abortive February coup.

#### Outlook

The conservative French African leaders still retaining power do not appear inclined to do anything which would seriously jeopardize their French aid. Their actions will in the main be symbolic and not intended to disturb the French position to any significant extent.

However, domestic pressures for a more independent posture are already increasing, spearheaded by the growing corps of nationalist-minded--and in some cases Communist-influenced--educated younger leaders. More and more of these "second-generation" leaders will eventually come to power, one way or another. All will assert greater independence from France, although particular circumstances will determine the pace and the scope of the changes they will seek.

The actions of Congo (Brazzaville) may well become the pattern which others will eventually follow, especially if its developing relations with the Communist world should result in significant increments of economic aid. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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